Seward’s play on April 1, 1861, involved a pri­vate meet­ing with Jus­tice Camp­bell, who vis­it­ed the State Depart­ment to dis­cuss Gov­er­nor Pickens’s telegram about the evac­u­a­tion of Fort Sumter. In this meet­ing, Sec­re­tary Seward pre­pared a state­ment for Camp­bell, reveal­ing that while Pres­i­dent Lin­coln might con­sid­er sup­ply­ing Fort Sumter, he would first noti­fy Gov­er­nor Pick­ens. This announce­ment left Camp­bell star­tled, as he ques­tioned the impli­ca­tions of Seward’s word­ing, which seemed to sug­gest a lev­el of inde­ci­sion or ambi­gu­i­ty in the Union’s stance on the fort. Seward’s attempt to man­age the sit­u­a­tion was com­pli­cat­ed by the broad­er polit­i­cal cli­mate and the increas­ing ten­sion between the North and South. This moment revealed the deep­en­ing frus­tra­tion Seward felt, as he tried to bal­ance the demands of the South while still hop­ing for a peace­ful res­o­lu­tion.

Despite Seward’s opti­mistic reas­sur­ances, plans for res­cu­ing Sumter were active­ly being devel­oped behind the scenes. Seward had hoped for a diplo­mat­ic res­o­lu­tion that would allow the fort to be evac­u­at­ed, buy­ing time for the Union’s recov­ery. He believed that by doing so, Lin­coln could restore peace and per­haps har­ness pro-Union sen­ti­ment in the South. How­ev­er, Seward also felt that Lin­coln was dis­tract­ed by small­er gov­ern­ment issues, mak­ing it hard­er for him to take deci­sive action. The ten­sion in the cab­i­net became more appar­ent as Seward saw the admin­is­tra­tion’s inabil­i­ty to act quick­ly or assertive­ly. He felt increas­ing­ly iso­lat­ed in his approach, yet still clung to the hope that Lin­coln might allow him to guide the nation through its strug­gles.

Amid this uncer­tain­ty, Seward took a bold step by send­ing Pres­i­dent Lin­coln a mem­o­ran­dum titled “Some Thoughts for the President’s Con­sid­er­a­tion.” In this doc­u­ment, Seward sug­gest­ed that the Union could evac­u­ate Fort Sumter, retain Fort Pick­ens, and even con­sid­er for­eign mil­i­tary con­flicts as a diver­sion to shift focus from inter­nal issues. His pro­pos­al indi­cat­ed a will­ing­ness to take dras­tic mea­sures, includ­ing the pos­si­bil­i­ty of war with for­eign pow­ers, in an attempt to strength­en the Union’s posi­tion. Seward hoped to assert greater con­trol over the administration’s direc­tion, sug­gest­ing that more ener­getic lead­er­ship was need­ed. How­ev­er, his move to seize the ini­tia­tive back­fired when Lincoln’s response, though polite, made it clear that Seward’s ideas were not aligned with the president’s plans for the nation.

Lincoln’s response, which was nev­er offi­cial­ly sent but was kept for his own records, sub­tly reaf­firmed his com­mit­ment to hold­ing Fort Sumter. By keep­ing his reply to Seward per­son­al and unad­dressed, Lin­coln com­mu­ni­cat­ed that the deci­sion was his to make and that he would take the lead in nav­i­gat­ing the cri­sis. This diplo­mat­ic silence, while cour­te­ous, demon­strat­ed Lincoln’s resolve to main­tain his author­i­ty dur­ing these tur­bu­lent times. The pres­i­den­t’s refusal to con­sid­er Seward’s pro­posed war or evac­u­a­tion plans revealed a deep divide in their strate­gies. Lincoln’s pref­er­ence for a more direct, con­trolled response to the Fort Sumter sit­u­a­tion fur­ther empha­sized the ongo­ing pow­er strug­gle with­in the Union’s lead­er­ship.

In the midst of these inter­nal dis­cus­sions, Jus­tice Camp­bell pri­vate­ly com­mu­ni­cat­ed with Con­fed­er­ate Pres­i­dent Jef­fer­son Davis. Camp­bell assured Davis that Fort Sumter would like­ly be evac­u­at­ed, with no sup­plies sent to rein­force it, based on his inter­pre­ta­tion of Seward’s ear­li­er state­ments. This com­mu­ni­ca­tion was based on Campbell’s mis­judg­ment of Lincoln’s inten­tions and his pre­sump­tion that the Union would back down with­out resis­tance. The con­fi­dence Camp­bell showed in his deal­ings with the Con­fed­er­a­cy was root­ed in a false belief that Lin­coln would not take imme­di­ate action. How­ev­er, this under-the-table exchange raised con­cerns with­in Seward’s cab­i­net, espe­cial­ly with Navy Sec­re­tary Gideon Welles, who not­ed the odd­i­ty of the com­mu­ni­ca­tion between Camp­bell and Seward, sig­nal­ing poten­tial dis­loy­al­ty.

The inter­ac­tions between Camp­bell and Seward’s office were per­ceived as sus­pect by mem­bers of Lincoln’s cab­i­net, sug­gest­ing that Seward may have been com­pro­mised. Welles’s com­ments point­ed to a grow­ing sense of unease about Seward’s actions and his abil­i­ty to rep­re­sent the Union’s inter­ests in a cri­sis. Lat­er devel­op­ments would reveal the depth of the betray­al, as Camp­bell was appoint­ed by the Con­fed­er­ate gov­ern­ment as their assis­tant sec­re­tary of war, con­firm­ing sus­pi­cions of his alle­giance to the South. This episode of intrigue added anoth­er lay­er of com­plex­i­ty to the unfold­ing polit­i­cal dra­ma, high­light­ing the chal­lenges Lin­coln faced in unit­ing the nation amid ris­ing ten­sions and inter­nal divi­sions. The con­flict over Fort Sumter and the han­dling of the Union’s response marked a crit­i­cal turn­ing point, reveal­ing the intri­cate pow­er strug­gles that would shape the course of the Civ­il War.