For­bear­ance marked the peri­od between Jan­u­ary 9–12 as Major Ander­son and his troops at Fort Sumter wit­nessed the Star of the West depart after being fired upon by Fort Moul­trie. Despite the clear provo­ca­tion, Ander­son ordered his gun­ners not to retal­i­ate, which frus­trat­ed Cap­tain Dou­ble­day. Dou­ble­day believed that fir­ing back was their duty, see­ing it as a nec­es­sary act of defense for the Amer­i­can flag. He argued that the fail­ure to act could have jeop­ar­dized their posi­tion, which was viewed as shock­ing by the South­ern forces, who expect­ed a more aggres­sive response. This inac­tion exem­pli­fied the inter­nal strug­gle Ander­son faced in bal­anc­ing the defense of the fort with the risk of esca­lat­ing ten­sions, a deci­sion that would weigh heav­i­ly as the con­flict con­tin­ued to build.

Amid the height­ened ten­sions, Ander­son con­vened a meet­ing with his offi­cers to dis­cuss whether they should use Fort Sumter’s artillery to block the har­bor. Some, includ­ing Dou­ble­day, advo­cat­ed for imme­di­ate bom­bard­ment, believ­ing it was the only way to pro­tect their posi­tion and show strength. How­ev­er, Lieu­tenant Meade warned against such action, empha­siz­ing the impor­tance of keep­ing defen­sive con­duct to avoid plung­ing the coun­try into a civ­il war. Meade’s cau­tion reflect­ed the deep con­cern with­in the Union ranks about the grow­ing pos­si­bil­i­ty of con­flict, and Ander­son ulti­mate­ly decid­ed against launch­ing any offen­sive. Instead, he chose to send a protest let­ter to Gov­er­nor Pick­ens in Charleston, seek­ing to under­stand the moti­va­tions behind the attack on the Star of the West and attempt­ing to defuse the sit­u­a­tion diplo­mat­i­cal­ly.

The protest let­ter, deliv­ered by Quar­ter­mas­ter Hall to Charleston, was met with cold recep­tion, as rumors of impend­ing vio­lence cir­cu­lat­ed. Anderson’s let­ter expressed that fir­ing on an unarmed ves­sel was unjus­ti­fied and sought clar­i­ty from the gov­er­nor on whether the attack had been autho­rized. Gov­er­nor Pick­ens’ response was defen­sive, jus­ti­fy­ing the action based on South Carolina’s altered polit­i­cal rela­tion­ship with the Unit­ed States. Despite this, Ander­son chose to main­tain his defen­sive stance, dis­re­gard­ing the jus­ti­fi­ca­tion for the attack and instead focus­ing on ensur­ing that Fort Sumter remained secure. His deci­sion high­light­ed his ded­i­ca­tion to hold­ing firm in the face of grow­ing ten­sions, even as the sit­u­a­tion con­tin­ued to esca­late.

As the pres­sure mount­ed, Ander­son decid­ed to send Lieu­tenant Tal­bot north for con­sul­ta­tion with the War Depart­ment. This move was seen as a nec­es­sary step in gain­ing fur­ther guid­ance as the sit­u­a­tion at the fort became more pre­car­i­ous. Mean­while, a sec­ond com­mu­ni­ca­tion from Gov­er­nor Pick­ens arrived, demand­ing the fort’s sur­ren­der, a request that Ander­son refused. He remained stead­fast in his belief that diplo­ma­cy should pre­vail, despite the increas­ing­ly dire cir­cum­stances sur­round­ing him. This refusal marked a crit­i­cal moment of defi­ance, show­ing Anderson’s com­mit­ment to his mis­sion even as he faced mount­ing pres­sure to yield to South­ern demands.

In antic­i­pa­tion of fur­ther nego­ti­a­tions with Gov­er­nor Pick­ens, Ander­son pro­posed send­ing Lieu­tenant Hall to meet with South Car­oli­na’s attor­ney gen­er­al, Isaac W. Hayne, and then go on to speak with Pres­i­dent Buchanan direct­ly. This deci­sion caused unease among the offi­cers at Fort Sumter, espe­cial­ly Cap­tain Dou­ble­day, who feared the poten­tial con­se­quences of delay­ing action. As South Car­oli­na con­tin­ued to strength­en its mil­i­tary forces, the fort remained under­pre­pared, deep­en­ing the sense of anx­i­ety among the Union offi­cers. This chap­ter cap­tures a key moment of restraint, as the offi­cers at Fort Sumter grap­pled with the weight of their deci­sions, which were filled with uncer­tain­ty, while the impend­ing sense of con­flict loomed ever clos­er. The fear of war was pal­pa­ble, yet the inter­nal strug­gle between action and cau­tion con­tin­ued to define their choic­es dur­ing this crit­i­cal peri­od in Amer­i­can his­to­ry.

The polit­i­cal and mil­i­tary sit­u­a­tion in Wash­ing­ton added to the ten­sion felt at Fort Sumter. Pres­i­dent Buchanan’s admin­is­tra­tion was seen as strug­gling to main­tain con­trol as seces­sion dis­cus­sions inten­si­fied across the South. With many South­ern states already prepar­ing to leave the Union, the pres­sure on Ander­son and his men grew dai­ly. In con­trast, the Union forces at Fort Sumter were left in a pre­car­i­ous posi­tion, unsure of how the gov­ern­ment would respond to the esca­lat­ing demands from the South. This uncer­tain­ty added to the emo­tion­al and psy­cho­log­i­cal toll faced by Ander­son and his offi­cers, who were torn between adher­ing to orders and nav­i­gat­ing the com­plex, fast-mov­ing polit­i­cal land­scape. The chap­ter under­scores the del­i­cate bal­ance between mil­i­tary action and diplo­ma­cy as both sides braced for the inevitable con­flict that would soon erupt.