Change of heart occurred for Pres­i­dent Lin­coln on March 28, just before his first state din­ner, when Gen­er­al Win­field Scot­t’s memo land­ed on his desk. The memo paint­ed a grim pic­ture of Fort Sumter’s sit­u­a­tion, not­ing that Anderson’s posi­tion was becom­ing increas­ing­ly unten­able due to Beauregard’s artillery instal­la­tions. Scott pre­dict­ed that any effort to relieve the fort would take at least ten months to orga­nize, dur­ing which Union forces would like­ly be defeat­ed. This grim assess­ment sug­gest­ed that the fort’s evac­u­a­tion should be expe­dit­ed as a peace-pro­mot­ing ges­ture, which was a dif­fi­cult con­clu­sion for Lin­coln to accept. Scott’s eval­u­a­tion, marked by its mil­i­tary and polit­i­cal impli­ca­tions, left Lin­coln deeply unset­tled, as it forced him to recon­sid­er his strat­e­gy regard­ing the loom­ing con­flict.

How­ev­er, Scot­t’s rec­om­men­da­tion didn’t stop at mere­ly advo­cat­ing for the evac­u­a­tion of Fort Sumter; he argued that such a move alone would not be enough to pre­serve the Union. He insist­ed that both Fort Sumter and Fort Pick­ens need­ed to be evac­u­at­ed to main­tain sup­port from the bor­der states and the upper South. Scott’s sug­ges­tion sent shock­waves through Lincoln’s mind, as it inter­twined mil­i­tary strat­e­gy with del­i­cate polit­i­cal con­cerns, fur­ther com­pli­cat­ing the already ten­u­ous sit­u­a­tion. Lin­coln was star­tled by the sug­ges­tion, as it seemed to posi­tion the fate of the Union’s cohe­sion and sur­vival on a risky, poten­tial­ly cat­a­stroph­ic move. His dis­tress mount­ed as he pre­pared for the state din­ner, feel­ing the weight of Scot­t’s words press­ing down on him. The enor­mi­ty of the deci­sion that was now on the table, involv­ing not just mil­i­tary strat­e­gy but polit­i­cal alle­giance, left Lin­coln in tur­moil.

The state din­ner, a live­ly and social occa­sion, pro­vid­ed a tem­po­rary escape for Lin­coln, yet his mind remained occu­pied with the trou­bling con­tent of Scot­t’s memo. Despite the fes­tiv­i­ties, Lin­col­n’s pre­oc­cu­pa­tion with the sit­u­a­tion at Fort Sumter was appar­ent, par­tic­u­lar­ly to the guests in atten­dance. Among them was William Rus­sell, who observed Lincoln’s sto­ry­telling, which appeared to be a tech­nique for dif­fus­ing ten­sion and nav­i­gat­ing dif­fi­cult sit­u­a­tions. Rus­sell, keen to under­stand Lincoln’s strat­e­gy con­cern­ing the seces­sion cri­sis, hoped to glean some insight into the president’s thoughts dur­ing the din­ner. How­ev­er, despite his close atten­tion, Rus­sell left the evening with no clear­er under­stand­ing of Lincoln’s inten­tions. The polit­i­cal com­plex­i­ty sur­round­ing Fort Sumter remained a tight­ly held secret, and Lincoln’s abil­i­ty to main­tain com­po­sure dur­ing the din­ner revealed his strate­gic focus, even in moments of deep per­son­al dis­tress.

After the din­ner, Lin­coln con­vened his cab­i­net pri­vate­ly to dis­cuss Scott’s mes­sage and its impli­ca­tions. The room was filled with ten­sion, and the silence that fol­lowed high­light­ed the grav­i­ty of the sit­u­a­tion. Post­mas­ter Gen­er­al Blair broke the silence, strong­ly crit­i­ciz­ing Scott for blend­ing mil­i­tary rec­om­men­da­tions with polit­i­cal con­sid­er­a­tions. Blair argued that Scott’s shift from a strict­ly mil­i­tary per­spec­tive to a polit­i­cal one was not only mis­guid­ed but dan­ger­ous for the Union’s sur­vival. Lin­coln, who had been mulling over Scott’s pro­pos­al, lis­tened care­ful­ly and then called for a for­mal cab­i­net meet­ing the fol­low­ing day to revis­it the resup­ply mis­sion to Fort Sumter. The polit­i­cal and mil­i­tary stakes were so high that every word and deci­sion could shape the future of the Union, leav­ing Lin­coln with lit­tle room for error.

The fol­low­ing day, as new infor­ma­tion emerged regard­ing pro-Union sen­ti­ment in South Car­oli­na, Lincoln’s cab­i­net revis­it­ed the deci­sion about the resup­ply mis­sion. After con­sid­er­ing this new intel­li­gence, most of the cab­i­net mem­bers changed their posi­tion, now favor­ing the resup­ply of Fort Sumter. Blair, push­ing for swift action to avoid esca­lat­ing con­flict, urged Lin­coln to move for­ward with the expe­di­tions with­out delay. Lin­coln, fac­ing mount­ing pres­sure from both with­in his cab­i­net and the coun­try, reluc­tant­ly agreed to autho­rize two expe­di­tions, one for Fort Sumter and anoth­er for Fort Pick­ens. How­ev­er, Lincoln’s deci­sion was fraught with risk, as both mis­sions relied on the same war­ship, the side-wheel steam frigate Powhatan. This logis­ti­cal con­flict cre­at­ed a sig­nif­i­cant chal­lenge for the admin­is­tra­tion, as it left the Union vul­ner­a­ble to unfore­seen com­pli­ca­tions. The poten­tial for dis­as­ter was high, and the risk of fail­ure loomed large as Lin­coln nav­i­gat­ed the increas­ing­ly com­plex sit­u­a­tion.

The cab­i­net’s deci­sion to move for­ward with the resup­ply mis­sions demon­strat­ed the inter­nal divi­sions and urgent pres­sure that Lin­coln faced. His approval of both expe­di­tions was a cal­cu­lat­ed move aimed at pre­vent­ing fur­ther con­flict, but it was also laden with the uncer­tain­ty of poten­tial fail­ure. The reliance on the Powhatan for both mis­sions high­light­ed the logis­ti­cal chal­lenges that the Union would soon face, fur­ther com­pli­cat­ing Lin­col­n’s strat­e­gy. The stakes of this deci­sion could not have been high­er, as the out­come would deter­mine not just the fate of Fort Sumter but the very future of the Union. Lincoln’s lead­er­ship was now being test­ed, and the choic­es he made in the com­ing days would have a last­ing impact on the course of the Civ­il War.