The Com­mis­sion­ers, rep­re­sent­ing the Con­fed­er­ate states, found them­selves at a crit­i­cal junc­ture between March 9 and March 13, 1861, as they attempt­ed to nav­i­gate the com­plex polit­i­cal cli­mate in Wash­ing­ton. They had learned of rumors sug­gest­ing the immi­nent evac­u­a­tion of Fort Sumter, which would mark a sig­nif­i­cant shift in the Union’s stance. The news of this poten­tial action was met with fierce crit­i­cism from North­ern fac­tions who viewed such a move as a betray­al of Lincoln’s promise to pre­serve fed­er­al prop­er­ties across the nation. How­ev­er, the Con­fed­er­ate com­mis­sion­ers remained opti­mistic, see­ing this as an oppor­tu­ni­ty to lever­age the sit­u­a­tion to their advan­tage. They com­mu­ni­cat­ed their belief to Robert Toombs, the Con­fed­er­a­cy’s Sec­re­tary of State, that the Union was like­ly prepar­ing to evac­u­ate the fort. This belief in an impend­ing evac­u­a­tion fos­tered a sense of hope among the com­mis­sion­ers, who saw it as an open­ing to push for for­mal recog­ni­tion of the Con­fed­er­a­cy by the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment.

The com­mis­sion­ers, under­stand­ing the intri­ca­cies of polit­i­cal maneu­ver­ing, believed that William Seward, Lincoln’s Sec­re­tary of State, held the key to shap­ing the administration’s deci­sions regard­ing the fate of Fort Sumter. Seward’s incli­na­tion toward a peace­ful res­o­lu­tion, they believed, was the dri­ving force behind his sup­port for the evac­u­a­tion of the fort. Attempt­ing to move things for­ward, the com­mis­sion­ers dis­creet­ly sought a meet­ing with Seward through Sen­a­tor R.M.T. Hunter, hop­ing to estab­lish a direct line of com­mu­ni­ca­tion. Unfor­tu­nate­ly for them, Seward declined their request, stat­ing that any meet­ing would require pri­or con­sul­ta­tion with Pres­i­dent Lin­coln, which the com­mis­sion­ers per­ceived as a per­son­al slight. Rather than yield­ing to Seward’s terms, they took a more for­mal approach by send­ing a let­ter to the State Depart­ment, assert­ing their mission’s impor­tance and demand­ing an offi­cial meet­ing to dis­cuss the sit­u­a­tion. This for­mal ges­ture demon­strat­ed their com­mit­ment to the cause, as well as their frus­tra­tion with the slow pace of nego­ti­a­tions and the Union’s reluc­tance to engage.

Days passed with­out a response, and the com­mis­sion­ers’ patience began to wear thin. Toombs, ever the staunch sup­port­er of the Con­fed­er­ate cause, praised their dig­ni­fied refusal to be dimin­ished, rein­forc­ing the idea that they rep­re­sent­ed a strong and inde­pen­dent nation. On March 13, the com­mis­sion­ers sent an offi­cial request for a meet­ing, hop­ing that this more for­mal approach would yield a response. How­ev­er, as time dragged on with­out any feed­back from the Lin­coln admin­is­tra­tion, the com­mis­sion­ers found them­selves increas­ing­ly frus­trat­ed by the lack of progress. Although they under­stood the strate­gic val­ue of wait­ing for the right moment to press their demands, the uncer­tain­ty about their next steps left them in a pre­car­i­ous posi­tion. The delay, while poten­tial­ly advan­ta­geous in the long run, cre­at­ed a sense of impa­tience and doubt with­in the com­mis­sion­ers as they pon­dered the next phase of their mis­sion.

In the midst of these polit­i­cal and diplo­mat­ic chal­lenges, John Forsyth, one of the com­mis­sion­ers, out­lined a more cau­tious and long-term strat­e­gy in a let­ter to Con­fed­er­ate Sec­re­tary of War Walk­er. Forsyth believed that the North’s grow­ing sen­ti­ment for peace could play in the Confederacy’s favor, and he hoped that by bid­ing their time, they could shift the bal­ance of pow­er in their direc­tion. How­ev­er, he also cau­tioned against rush­ing into any hasty actions that could inad­ver­tent­ly lead to war. Forsyth acknowl­edged that mis­cal­cu­la­tions on either side could esca­late ten­sions, ulti­mate­ly lead­ing to unfore­seen con­flict. As a result, he advo­cat­ed for a more mea­sured approach, one that cap­i­tal­ized on the ris­ing peace sen­ti­ments in the North while avoid­ing unnec­es­sary provo­ca­tion. At the same time, Seward remained firm in his stance, aware that any for­mal recog­ni­tion of the Con­fed­er­ate com­mis­sion­ers would deeply under­mine the Union’s posi­tion. He knew that such an acknowl­edg­ment could incite war, a sce­nario he des­per­ate­ly sought to avoid.

The com­plex­i­ty of this polit­i­cal dance, with both sides maneu­ver­ing care­ful­ly, reveals the pre­car­i­ous­ness of the sit­u­a­tion in ear­ly 1861. While the Con­fed­er­ate com­mis­sion­ers sought to exploit the poten­tial for an evac­u­a­tion at Fort Sumter as a means of gain­ing recog­ni­tion, they also under­stood the risks of push­ing too hard. Seward, on the oth­er hand, was caught in a del­i­cate bal­anc­ing act, try­ing to main­tain the Union’s integri­ty while simul­ta­ne­ous­ly avoid­ing war. The lack of clear com­mu­ni­ca­tion and the absence of deci­sive action only fueled the mount­ing ten­sions. This chap­ter high­lights the intri­cate nature of diplo­ma­cy dur­ing the lead-up to the Civ­il War, where every word, every ges­ture, and every delay could sig­nif­i­cant­ly alter the course of his­to­ry. The com­mis­sion­ers’ strug­gle to secure recog­ni­tion for the Con­fed­er­a­cy, cou­pled with Seward’s care­ful han­dling of the sit­u­a­tion, set the stage for the deep­er polit­i­cal and mil­i­tary con­flicts that would soon engulf the nation.