In “The Dev­il’s Trade Mark,” from “Black Beau­ty,” the nar­ra­tive unfolds as John and Black Beau­ty, after attend­ing to their master’s busi­ness, wit­ness a trou­bling scene. A young boy, lat­er iden­ti­fied as Mr. Bush­by’s son, is bru­tal­ly try­ing to coerce a pony into jump­ing over a gate. The pony, resis­tant and dis­tressed by the boy’s harsh treatment—whipping, kick­ing, and striking—ultimately rebels, cat­a­pult­ing the boy into a thorn hedge and then flee­ing home. John, find­ing slight amuse­ment in the boy’s mis­for­tune, opts not to assist him, con­sid­er­ing the ordeal a just reper­cus­sion for the boy’s cru­el­ty.

Upon near­ing Mr. Bush­by’s farm, Mr. Bush­by and his wife, anx­ious and fright­ened, inquire about their son. John recounts the episode to Mr. Bush­by, con­demn­ing the boy’s vile treat­ment towards the pony and sub­tly advo­cat­ing for the wel­fare and respect­ful treat­ment of ani­mals. Mr. Bush­by, tak­ing heed of John’s account, rec­og­nizes the urgency to rep­ri­mand his son’s behavior—a recur­ring issue—not just for the safe­ty of the pony but to instill a les­son in empa­thy and respon­si­bil­i­ty in his son.

Mr. Bush­by’s resolve to dis­ci­pline his son, cou­pled with John’s and the house groom James’s dis­course over the inci­dent and past instances of the boy’s supe­ri­or­i­ty com­plex and cru­el­ty, under­scores a broad­er soci­etal repul­sion towards inhu­mane acts. It brings to light issues of ani­mal abuse, the impor­tance of empa­thy, and the con­se­quences of unchecked aggres­sion in youths. The chap­ter con­cludes with a reflec­tion on past admon­ish­ments against cru­el­ty, empha­siz­ing its recog­ni­tion as both a moral fail­ing and a soci­etal con­cern.

This seg­ment of “Black Beau­ty” serves not only as a cau­tion against the mal­treat­ment of the vul­ner­a­ble but as a nar­ra­tive cham­pi­oning the virtues of kind­ness, jus­tice, and the moral growth aris­ing from fac­ing the con­se­quences of one’s actions. It sharply crit­i­cizes not only the act of cru­el­ty itself but the broad­er impli­ca­tions it has on moral char­ac­ter, mark­ing such behav­ior as fun­da­men­tal­ly unjust and social­ly rep­re­hen­si­ble.